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NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM: QUARTERLY REPORT
NO. 11
Ames Research Center
and
Aviation Safety Reporting Office*
SUMMARY
This eleventh quarterly report of ASRS operations contains a comprehensive study of near
midair collisions in terminal airspace, derived from the ASRS database. This study was scheduled
originally for publication in an earlier quarterly report; because of its significance to the aviation
community, its publication was deferred to allow time for review and comment by various segments
of the community. This report also includes a selection of controller and pilot reports on airport
perimeter security, unauthorized takeoffs and landings, and on winter operations. A sampling of
typical Alert Bulletins and their responses appears as the final section of the report.
INTRODUCTION
This is the eleventh in a series of reports based on operations of tile NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) (refs. 1-10) under a Memorandum of Agreement between the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration.
The first section presents aviation safety reports related to three problem areas - airport perim-
eter security, unauthorized takeoffs and landings, and winter operations. A study of near midair
collisions in terminal airspace, utilizing data from pertinent ASRS reports, is contained in the
second section. The final section provides a selection of ASRS Alert Bulletins and the responses to
them.
*Battelle's Columbus Division, Mountain View, California 94043.
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTS
ASRS Quarterly Reports usually include a section composed of sample report narratives sub-
mitted by members of the aviation community. This edition carries a series devoted to airport
perimeter security, unauthorized takeoffs and landings, and winter operations.
Airport Perimeter Security
Reports under this broad heading fall into a number of categories, but all feature the trespass
onto airport operating areas of people, animals, or vehicles not properly belonging there. The first
two reports that follow come from different controllers at different times, but from the same Mid-
west airport.
1. Aircraft had to go around from a position over the landing threshold at a low alti-
tude because of two bicycle riders who crossed the runway in front of him. This is a fre-
quent and extremely dangerous occurrence at this airport...
2. Two people were playing with a football near tile approach end of runway 25.
When we notified the city ops and they approached the people, the people ran across the
road and got away. A person on a motorcycle approached the runway very fast. About 30
yards short of the runway he made a right turn and paralleled the runway. He then went
to the approach end of the runway and reversed course. Again, city ops was called and
chased the people off the airport.
People, with or without vehicles, are a constant threat to safety, particularly at privately owned
airports where funds and personnel are often insufficient to maintain fences and gates. Animal
intrusions onto runways are an even greater threat; signs do not deter them and they find their way
through, under, or over barriers. In some cases they show no fear of landing or departing aircraft.
3. Aircraft was cleared for takeoff on runway 24. As the aircraft took the runway,
two dogs were observed crossing the runway approximately 3,500 ft down from the
approach end. At this time an advisory was given to the pilot who, a moment or two later,
said he had the dogs in sight. The pilot then apparently hesitated on the runway for about
10 seconds before applying power and starting departure roll. As the aircraft started to
roll, the dogs were about 75 to 100 ft off to the side of the runway. It appeared that as
soon as the dogs heard the increased noise they turned and ran towards the sound of the
jet .... Two months ago a pilot was given an advisory about dogs near the runway and,
stating that he had them in sight, elected to depart. This time the dogs made it to the run-
way ahead of the aircraft, and the pilot was forced to make an abrupt and early rotation,
passing just a few feet above the dogs. The pilot was a local corporate pilot who had the
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skill andexperienceto handletheproblemwithout incident.However,I wasnot theonly
onein thetowerto gasp- it wasclose.
4. On takeoffrunway28Rat 95-100mphI wasforcedto makeanabruptpull-upto
avoiddeer(aboutsix) crossingfrom left to fight. I hit onedeerwith left maingeartire.
No damageto aircraft.Damageto deer unknown.Severaltimesduringthe past3weeks
I've beenwarnedof the presenceof deerby ATC. In this casedeerhadnot previously
beenreported.HadI beengoingsloweror on landingroll, therecouldhavebeenanacci-
dent.About 2 weeksagoadeerwaskilledon therunwayby aircraft.Withthedeerpres-
ent,nightflight operationsbecomeadefinitehazard.
Pedestriansappearwith frequencyin perimetersecurityreports,asdo children- sometimes
mischievous,ometimesinnocent.
5. The field isborderedbyapark to the west. There are many openings, holes in the
fence where juveniles come through, walk up to and onto airport surfaces. In this instance,
one boy, part of a group, walked onto the surface and waved his arms as a dare, to land-
ing and departing aircraft. There was a period of about 3 minutes when we had to close
the runway. The kids, chased away by airport personnel, return as soon as they leave.
6. Aircraft (call sign unknown) reported two pedestrians approaching runway. City
operations advised of above; will respond. Two pedestrians crossed runway 25 ft in front
of aircraft midway down the runway on final approach to a long landing. At that time air-
craft was issued a go around. Aircraft passed the pedestrians (off his left wing) just as he
cleared the runway. It was very close.
Motor vehicles on various missions account for the largest number of airport trespasses. The
first report below cannot be classed strictly as a violation of perimeter security but illustrates a haz-
ard to normal airport use. Those that follow are typical of the many received by ASRS.
7. A bus-driver training school is being conducted on XXX Airport without FSS
being told. I discovered this as I turned final and saw that several buses had driven onto
the airstrip. I was in communication with XXX Radio, a YYY remote and had just given
them a PIREP. I had overflown the airstrip to see the sock and gave the PIREP on my
downwind leg. Because of the canyon and wind conditions, I did not see the airstrip dur-
ing base leg. The buses drove onto the runway after I left downwind and after I had
talked with XXX. Evasive pilot action was required. The buses remained on the field dur-
ing the landing and were unaware that their presence comprised a hazard to landing air-
craft. The drivers of the buses were trainees who were trying to pass a driving skills test.
The airport is postedwith a signwarningthemto keepoff the runwayproper.Traffic
coneswereseton the runwayrestrictingonethird of its width at midfield.Thesewere
not seenfrom theflyby andnot seenuntil roll out.
8. Aircraft A completedalocalflight. Its pilot andonepassengerdecidedto takeoff
for a secondpracticenight landing.No trafficof any kind wasvisibleto the pilot ashe
beganhis takeoff roll. After about 400 ft of T/O roll, at an estimated45 knots,he
observedan automobileproceedingfrom behindT-hangars(to the left of the runway)
onto the runway.The autombileproceededdiagonallyacrossthe runway,appliedits
brakes,andstoppedon therunway.Aircraft A wasunableto divertto the left becauseof
the proximity of thehangars,unableto divertto therightbecausethat wastheapparent
pathof the automobile,and unableto stopbecauseof theproximityof theautomobile.
The pilot continuedthe takeoff run, movedto the left edgeof therunway,andcom-
menceda sharpleft turn at liftoff. A witnesson the airportgroundsdescribedtheevent
asfollows:"1 sawtheaircraftandautocollide,but heardnonoise.It wasn'tuntil asecond
later that I realizedthepilot hadavoidedthecollision."This field is oneof manygeneral
aviationairportswherethereis easyaccessto the tie-downareasby automobile.As a
pilot, I find this convenient.As a pilot, I look both waysbeforecrossingarunway.The
driverof the autowasnot herselfa pilot, but is the wilL,of apilot.Shewascrossingthe
runwayto meetherhusbandat hisaircraft.Shewasnot thinkingof cautionat thetime.
Manyairportsaresurroundedby landdevotedto agriculturalactivity;it isobviousthat such
activity will generateconsiderablevehicularcomingsand goings.The ubiquitouspickup truck
appearsin this final narrativeof theset.
9. NovemberLima OneFive, an FI06 military fighter aircraft, wasforcedto go
arounddueto a no-radiofarmpickuptruck whichcrossedthelandingrunwaydirectlyin
front of theaircraft.1wasworkingthegroundcontrolpositionandwasawareof ahaying
operationon the northwestsideof runway21at the departureend.It wasdecidedto
combinethelocalandgroundcontrolpositionsand I relieved the local, while keeping the
ground position. I was briefed on the position and the only traffic was NL15 on short
final, already cleared to land. NLI5 stated he was going around and requested closed
traffic. At this time I noticed NL15 gear up on the go and a pickup truck which appeared
to be stopped about 5,000 ft ahead of him. The truck then sped off the runway. Appar-
ently the truck came off the highway, across the runway 21 parallel taxiway, then crossed
the active runway. I had looked at the vicinity where the truck crossed no more than 30
seconds prior to the incident and 1 observed no vehicles. Previous local controller stated
he also checked the runway prior to issuing landing clearance to NL15, and he also
observed no vehicles. I believe the pilot made a timely and accurate decision with regard
to the go-around and saved an imminent situation. It is my understanding that farm crews
are allowed on the airport to cut and remove the hay. They have no radios but are forbid-
den to cross any runways without radio contact.
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UnauthorizedTakeoffsandLandings
Good practiceandregulationsalikemandatethat pilots obtaina clearancefrom ATC before
commencinga takeoff orexecutingalandingat acontrolledairport.For anumberof reasons,most
notably distractionor misunderstanding,aircraft neverthelesscontinueto comeandgo without
appropriateauthorization.Culpabilityfor manyof theseunsanctionedoperationscanbeassignedto
useof less-than-clearphraseology.Adherenceto the policy of clearanceacknowledgmentor read-
backwouldeliminatea proportionof thesepotentiallyhazardousincidents.Mindset- theprecon-
ceivedmessage,hearingwhatoneexpectsto hear- accounts for many of the incidents. Many more
are caused by complacency in the form of frequency-change neglect. In the set of unauthorized
takeoff reports that follow, several of these points are illustrated. The first report differs from the
typical in that it describes the mistake made by a pilot of limited experience, who, happily, learned
a useful lesson. The other reports follow more common patterns.
1. Ground Control instructed me to taxi to runway 17. At this point I wasn't sure if
"taxi to" meant authorization to be on 17 or just be short of 17. I had anticipated a reply
of "taxi to and hold short of runway 17." There were two planes just in front of me taxi-
ing out. I thought that I would just listen to ground frequency and see what they trans-
mitted to Ground. I followed the two other planes out to the hold-short line and waited
for them to take off. At this time I had heard no transmissions by Ground since 1 had ad-
vised them of being ready to taxi. I decided that the airplanes in front of me had probably
been given the same instructions to taxi to runway 17. Thinking this, and hearing no fur-
ther ground instructions or communications between the planes in front of me, I decided
that "taxi to" meant clearance to taxi onto active runway. (I realize now that the two
planes in front were probably on tower frequency from the beginning). The reason I felt
that 1 would hear further instructions between Ground and the planes in front was I
thought Ground had to tell you to switch to Tower before you could. Following what I
thought was correct, I taxied onto the active when the plane directly in front of me was
full throttle and well on its way down the runway. I applied full throttle and at about one
half the runway, Ground contacted me and asked if I was on the active. I replied, yes. He
then stated I didn't have permission. I apologized. I then contacted Tower and asked for
permission to make a right crosswind departure over the city. They said I could, so I
departed. I realize now that the problem lay with my lack of knowledge as to proper ter-
minology at that time. I have taken measures to correct this [ack of knowledge while fly-
ing in the Air Traffic Control area.
2. Airline flight taxied on Ground Control. Received IFR clearance with void time
2 minutes away. Both of us extremely rushed to complete checklists, both under the
impression takeoff clearance had been received along with IFR clearance. However, after
takeoff we noted the comm receiver was still tuned to Ground, and we realized we had
taken off without clearance .... Several factors here: (1) Biggest was adjusting to the
presence of a separate ground control frequency at this airport. Both of us have flown for
years around this area and have always seen ground and local functions performed on a
single frequency at the outlying airports. In particular, at this airport, where clearance
void times are often scant minutes away, takeoff clearances have been issued concurrently
with ATC clearances while the aircraft is still taxiing. I believe a long period of this prac-
tice had conditioned us to expect a takeoff clearance under these circumstances, and it
just didn't "click" that we needed to switch frequencies and specifically ask for one. We
were both convinced we had been cleared for takeoff until we saw the radios were still
tuned to Ground. (2) We received zero help from ATC .... Although we certainly erred
by misinterpreting our clearance, a call from ATC on ground control would have stopped
us immediately.
3. I received a Special VFR clearance .... The ceiling was about 900 ft and visibility
was good. The controller told me he had my SVFR and to taxi to runway 31. I taxied to
runway 31 and did a run-up, then the controller said l had SVFR and was cleared out of
the control zone. I took this second transmission to mean [ was cleared to leave take
off- and I did. The next communication was something like this: "Turn right to 040 ° ,
and you were not cleared for takeoff." I acknowledged this. and then a few minutes later
reported leaving the control zone, as requested. The problem was discovered because the
controller told me .... ! believe the factors that contributed to this occurrence were as
follows: (1) I was damp and cold from the rain and low temperature: this may have dis-
tracted me. (2) The controller first told me I had SVFR when I was on the ramp. After I
had done the run-up at the hold line, he once again said 1 had SVFR and was cleared out
of the control zone. I took this as a clearance to take off. l had taxied to the runway with
knowledge that I had SVFR, or 1 wouldn't have taxied at all. After my run-up and the
second transmission from the controller about being cleared out of the control zone, my
mind was ready to go _ especially when hearing the word "cleared" after my run-up.
The following narrative illustrates how a number of circumstances, individually untroublesome,
can combine to cause concern. The reporting pilot analyzes the situation with clarity and offers sug-
gestions to prevent recurrence. On this occasion, the partially-blocked transmission and flight num-
ber similarity problems, both often found in other flight situations, appear.
4. While holding short, Number 1 for takeoff, wc werc advised of a 3-minute delay.
In about 3 minutes we were cleared for immediate takeoff. I taxied into position, noting
lights of aircraft on approach which seemed fairly close, but not unreasonably so. The
first officer acknowledged the takeoff clearance in detail as we started to taxi into posi-
tion. I then took off. After takeoff, the tower advised that we had not been cleared for
takeoff. (1) We were Number 1 for takeoff. (2) No mention was made of an intersection
takeoff. (3) All aircraft holding short, Number 1 for takeoff on this runway, face
approaching traffic and cannot see aircraft taxiing for intersection takeoffs. (4) The first
officer carefully acknowledged the takeoff clearance in detail and was not questioned'by
Tower. (5) All available exterior lights on aircraft were on as we taxied into position and
took off.
Results: Takeoff clearance was intended for another aircraft. (1) His call sign was
similar. (2) Both aircraft simultaneously acknowledged it. (3) The other aircraft took off
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aheadof usfrom an intersectionseveralthousandfeetdowntherunway- hislightshid-
denby aslightcrownin therunway.
Suggestions:(1) Intersectiontakeoffsshouldbereferredto by name.(2) hnmediate
takeoffs,with tile hastetheyconnotate,shouldnot besuggestedby towersnoraccepted
by commercialcarriers.(3) Any time two aircraftarein positionandexpectingtakeoff
clearance,Towershouldnotepositionof both aircraftafter issuingtakeoff clearance-
especiallyif he is talkingrapidly, their numbersaresimilar,andthe acknowledgmentis
garbled.
In the final takeoff incidentin thisset, the "immediatetakeoff" phraseoncemoreappears,
althoughwith differenteffect.
5. Aircraft "B" wason a 2V2-milefinalto runway32L,clearedto land.Aircraft "C"
wasclearedto land on runway35, to hold shortof runway32L intersection.Aircraft
"A" washoldingshortof runway35,readyfor takeoff.I wasworkinglocalcontrolposi-
tion in the towerandasked"A" if hecouldmakeanimmediatetakeoff.Herepliedthat
hecouldandwassubsequentlyclearedfor immediatetakeoff on runway35. "A" satin
positionon the runwayfor anextendedperiodof time andwasinstructedto cancelhis
takeoff clearanceandtaxi off the runway.Hedid not respondto theseinstructionsand
departed,passingthroughthe intersectionof runway32L. Both "B" and"C" wereon
shortfinal to their respectiverunwaysandhadto beissuedgoaroundinstructions.
Distractionsattributableto trafficwatch,concernoverweather,andlast-minutechecklistitems
often causecockpit crewsto neglectthe frequencyswitch from ApproachControl to Tower.
Although pilots nearlyalwaysacceptthe responsibilityfor landingwithout clearance,they fre-
quently - andveryhumanly- point to contributingfactors.Thefirst narrativein thefollowingset
dealswith adoubleviolationof procedure:two aircraftcaughtin thesametrap.
6. Captainwasflying the aircraftwhenwewereclearedfor an ILS to runway5R.
Weatherconditionswere500/1 1/2 in blowingsnow,with brakingaction reportedas
poor.The first officer acknowledgedthe approachclearancewhichincludedinstructions
to contactthetowerat theoutermarker.First officer failedto switchto towerfrequency,
whichwasnot detectedby captain,and subsequentlytheaircraftlandedwithout a land-
ing clearance.At the sametime, anotherair carrieraircraftwasonapproachcontrolfre-
quencyfor anapproachto theparallelrunway,5L. A conversationtook placebetween
that aircraftandApproachControlregardingthefield condition,brakingaction,thepos-
sibility of havingthe runwaystreatedagain,etc. His preoccupationwith thesefactors
causedhim alsoto fail to switch to towerfrequencyfor a landingclearance.WhileI can-
not but acceptfull responsibilityfor my failureto obtaina landingclearance,I believe
therearesomehumanfactorsinvolvedthat ledto bothaircraftlanding"unannounced."
7. Flight wasIFR inboundfrom the north, clearedthrougha seriesof frequency
changesandradarvectorsuntil in contactwithApproach.ATISindicatedradarvectorsto
runway 13Rtraffic pattern.Whenwithin 5 milesof airport,ApproachControlaskedif
we preferredrunway 18. Wc respondedaffirnlativelybut requestedrunway length.
Approachslowto answer "Clearedto runway18,goto Towero11118.7,runwaylength
6,100ft." Captaindidn't hearrunwaylength:copilot lookedit upaftersetting118.7o21
transceiver.Copilot did not usethrowoverswitchto geton 118.7,however.At thispoint
flight wason a high,closefinal to 18andbusycompletingchecklist.Landedwithout
landingclearancefrom Towerand still on approachcontrol frequency.ApproachCon-
trols arenow usingterminologytraditionallythat of the towerwhengivingvectorsfor
visualapproaches:"You areNumbertwo ondownwindfor 31: followtheaircraftin your
two o'clockposition:clearedto runway18."
8. Approachwasbeingmadeto runway4R in VFR conditionswith considerable
vectoringandconsiderablecommunicationtraffic. An approachfromanapproximate90°
baseleg wasbeingplannedfrom directionsgivenby Approach Control. Then we were
asked if we could proceed directly to the airport, or words to that effect, so that we
would therefore cut the corner, as the extra time to make a 90 ° turn was apparently not
needed. Since we were close in, we hurried our final landing configuration and checklists.
At this point, Approach Control said something about 'q'ower" and "landing." None of
the three crew members caught the exact transmission; I assumed we had landing clear-
ance and executed the landing... My first officer noticed the problem when he was about
to switch to Ground Control - we were still on approach control frequency. A switch to
Tower was then made, and the tower asked if we would kindly switch to him more
quickly. I believe allowing ourselves to become distracted because the approach was
smooth, routine, and VFR, but coupled with an abundance of radio chatter that we did
not key up to, contributed greatly to the landing without tower clearance.
9. We approached the airport from the northeast on a "Low Profile Descent" for
runway 17: I (captain) was flying. Last assigned altitude was l 1,000 ft, heading 240 ° , at
210 knots. We were then asked if we had the airport and traffic at twelve o'clock in sight.
Replying, "Affirmative," we were cleared for a visual approach to 17L. This required a
fairly steep descenl to intercept the landing profile for 17L. as the approach end is more
than a mile further north than 17R. Also, this brought us ahnost abeam the traffic sighted
going to 17R. Our concern was watching the aircraft on our right and intercepting the
proper landing profile. To the best of my knowledge, we did not receive instructions to
switch to tower frequency until touchdown, and shortly thereafter I noticed we were still
on approach control frequency. The first officer immediately switched to tower fre-
quency and we heard the tower call ttS. Upon answering, the controller asked, "Do you
want clearance to land?" As we were already on the rollout, this seemed somewhat face-
tious. The first officer replied, "Well - yes." The controller then said something to the
effect that, "It's not funny. This is serious business." A few minutes later, after advising
us to contact Ground Control, we were told to telephone the tower. I called the tower
after arrival at the gate and apologized to the tower supervisor for missing the clearance.
The supervisor said the controller heard laughing and inferred we didn't take the situation
seriously.I assuredhim that no onewaslaughingandexplainedwhy I thoughtwehad
missedthe frequencychangefor clearance.At no time did I seea conflict in traffic on
the runway;it wasclear.I feel that had we beenadvisedearlierof our sequencefor
landingandwhichrunwaywewoulduse,it wouldcertainlyhavealleviatedthesituation.
Multiple - eitherparallelor intersecting- runwaysaddanextraerror-inducingelemento the
alreadycomplexsituation.Extremealertnessis requiredof controllers,aswell asflightcrews,dur-
ingtheapproach-landingphaseof flight.
10. I wasworkinglocalNo. 2 positionin thetower.Aircraft "A" calledreadyfor
departureon runway33R. After verifyingmy Number1aircraft for 33R wason right
base,I cleared"A" to taxi into positionandhold. Recheckingthefinal, I sawanuniden-
tiffed aircraft "B" on a shortfinal for runway33R.He flewoveraircraft"A" andlanded
in front of him,at whichtimehemadethefirst left turn andclearedtherunway.I subse-
quently learned that aircraft "B" was cleared to land on runway 33L, which is separated
by 900 ft from 33R. Weather was clear, visibility 6 in haze.
The final report in this series shows that professional flightcrews and inexperienced general
aviation pilots alike are subject to lapses of attention. Report No. 12 was submitted by a pilot with
the highest flight time yet reported to ASRS.
l 1. I was in a small aircraft about to land after completing the first of three legs of
the "long cross-country" requirement for the commercial pilot certificate. Approach Con-
trol turned me over to the tower, who gave me instructions to land - I was to enter left
base. A short time later I landed. Upon touching down, I was told to telephone the tower.
Ahead of me - at least 1,000 ft off - was what seemed to be a snowplow. At this point I
realized I had landed without being cleared by the tower. I realize the mistake I made
could have created a potentially dangerous situation; it is certainly something I won't for-
get. I do feel I was clear of the runway well ahead of the plow (which I, of course, did not
see until I was on the runway). The tower never did call me to warn of the hazard on the
runway. I'm certainly not trying to shift blame, as I was not, in fact, cleared to land -
obviously an oversight for which only I am to blame. The tower also told me I did not
report on base - I do not recall being asked to. Perhaps in the future I will always report
on base if not already cleared to land. I was keeping an eye out for other traffic and obvi-
ously didn't check out the full length of the runway as well as I should have. I've certainly
learned a few lessons from this. Recurrences could be prevented by (1) always reporting
on base if not already cleared to land, and (2) by making sure I'm cleared for landing.
12. Approach cleared us for a visual landing if we had airport in sight. We did. As I
recall, he did not say, "Go to Tower, I 18.1," and we neglected to do so. On landing we
switched to Ground Control and got clearance to cross left runway and to the gate.
Nothing was said as we were having problems with our landing light and Ground Control
madeno mentionof it: It waslatenight,no traffic to spearof. Wewere1:10 lateona
5-hourtrip. I think this is a crucial period of flight; from the time Approach Control
turns you over to Tower, you only have about 2 to 4 minutes to switch, which is a little
tight-and a busy part of the flight. I have noticed that sometimes you have to ask to
switch over to Tower. But also it is everybody's job to do so and we fell down on our part.
Winter Operations
The onset of winter, following the often benign autumn weather, invariably brings with it chal-
lenging difficulties for flightcrews and ground support staff. The majority of ASRS reports peculiarly
related to winter deal with ground-associated occurrences. Leaving aside low visibilities and ceil-
ings, and rain-features not restricted to the winter months-some reports do describe cold-weather
effects on flight. The first narrative in this section illustrates one hazard encountered by a general
aviation pilot fying a small aircraft. Efficient and cooperative air traffic control personnel, a pilot
who kept his head, and some luck combined to avert a potentially disastrous event.
1. The engine quit shortly after switching to left fuel tank from right tank. Would
not restart with fuel selector valve in any position. I so informed Approach and was given
vectors to an airport about 5 or 6 miles east, across the bay. Approach was very helpful
with vectors, traffic advisories, and telephoning the airport to find the active runway.
A safe landing was accomplished. After landing, I found that only slow drips of fuel could
be obtained by pulling strainer drain knob. 1 was able to start engine after a wait and taxi
several hundred feet before it quit. After several starts, I taxied to the ramp area. A heat
gun was used to warm the low-point drain plug, after which fl_el flowed freely. It appears
that a small piece of ice must have come from the left tank after I switched and was
caught in the drain, blocking further fuel flow from all tanks. Temperature at cruising
altitude was 17°F, and the overnight temperature was in the 20s; no traces of water or ice
were seen during preflight. However, a sharp cold front had recently come through after
some warm, wet weather and the inside of the cockpit had ice and frost on windshield
and on the area just above:the 'windshield. When we turned the aircraft into the sun to
melt frost from the wings and windshield, this ice melted and dripped into the cockpit.
I believe that there must have been a similar situation in the tanks, and that water from
melting ice dripped into the fuel and then froze as droplets. The tanks were not full. This
is a club aircraft and the possibility of water condensing in partially full tanks has been
discussed often. The club has a rule that pilots should fill tanks after a flight, but the
planes frequently do not get refueled after returning from flights if the pilot is not inclined
for some reason to taxi over to the GA terminal area and look up a lineman for service.
The next narrative illustrates initiative and ingenuity on the part of the pilot of a turboprop
aircraft in his effort to avoid a long ground delay. It also suggests an unintended use for those large
paddle propeller blades.
2. My flight was operating through the airport with scheduled ground time of
approximately 1 hour. Heavy snow had begun to fall just prior to landing on the inbound
leg. My company does not have its own people at this airport, and we are handled on the
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groundby anotherair carrier.BeforedeparturetimeI calledfor theaircraftto bede-iced
asa precautionandwastold that no deicingequipmentwasavailable;alsothat noother
carrierwouldbeableto loantheir equipmentfor at least2hours.A walk-aroundinspec-
tion of the aircraftshowedacollectionof dry powderedsnowon theuppersurfacesthat
couldeasilybebrushedwith abroom.Therewas11oevidenceof anyice.
I startedthe enginesandrepositionedthe aircraftawayfrom thegate.A subsequent
inspectionshowedthat the snowon the aircrafthad beenblownoff andno iceexisted.
1departedapproximately1 hour and20minuteslate. I makethisreportsolelyto docu-
ment that evenin this "moderntime" of aviation,pilots arecalleduponto "ad lib" (in
theabsenceof) necessarygroundsupportequipment.
Abnormalbrakingresponseiscitedfrequentlyin winterlandingincidents.In somecases,pilots
aredeceivedby appearances;in others,by lackof informationconcerningconditionsandarethus
lulledinto unwarrantedconfidence.
3. After beingclearedby Center, we commenced the localizer approach. While the
copilot was monitoring ATC, I called UNICOM, for advisory service. They told me that
the visibility looked good-about 1 mile, with wind from the east-northeast about 10. No
mention was made of runway conditions and I asked to have the lights turned up full
bright. Descending to our MDA of 1,100 ft there was good visual contact with the ground.
The runway came into view approximately 3/4 mile from the approach end. Then I
noticed a snowplow on the extreme right edge of the approach end of the runway. I delayed
the vertical descent rate slightly to make sure the right wing would clear the plow; this
caused me to land slightly longer than normal. The runway appeared to be in perfect con-
dition - all dry and bare. Upon landing, ground fine and braking felt normal on first
application; subsequent brake applications became less and less effective until there was
no effect at all. By this time I did not believe we could make a go-around; consequently
we slid off the end of the runway approximately 30 ft. The odd part in my opinion is
that the aircraft never appeared to slip or skid at all. It went straight ahead and appeared
to accelerate rather than stop.
4. Aircraft slid off the runway onto over-run. Came to rest 15° right of centerline
and approximately 150 ft (nose) from runway end. Runway 27L is 10,000 ft long. Sur-
face was snow-packed except for an area from east end to intersection of 32L that was
about 75 ft wide down the middle. ATIS info advised braking was "fair to good."
Approach was completely normal at bug plus 10 knots (wind 240 ° at 6). Touchdown
point was normal in that we did not float excessively; I would just touch down about
1,500 ft down runway. Reverse was normal, with braking applied at 80 knots and coming
out of reverse, at that time. Deceleration was normal and we almost made turnoff at 32L,
but for maybe 10 knots. We knew we couldn't do a 180 ° turn with traffic close behind,
so accelerated to maybe 40 knots (not registering airspeed) to hurry to end for turnoff.
Shortly after passing 32L intersection, Tower asked us to expedite to end. At this point,
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I felt weweregoingfastenough.I alsonotedat this time that runwaywascompletely
snow-packedandwhite, that is, no sandvisible.As soonasTowermaderequest,I tried
brakesto checkeffect. No brakingnoticed(anti-skidon). Westill had,I wouldjudge,
2,500ft remainingsowaiteduntil wegot closerand slowerfrom coastingbeforeapply-
ing brakesagain.No reverseusedasI felt that wecouldstill turn off andthat reversing
effectivenesswouldbe nil anywayat this slowspeed.At ahout500 ft from endandat
about10knots,andwith brakeson, it becameapparentwecouldnot reducespeedfurther
by time of turnoff at end.Somenosewheelsteeringwasefl\_ctive.Estimate18in. plow
ridgeon edgeof turnoff taxiwayandabout 12 in. standingsnowonover-runarea.I was
concernedaboutsidestressongearshould1turn aircraftsidewaysandhit snowbankat
turnoff. I electedto turn right slightly to avoidfirst approachlightstanchion,not know-
ing how far I wouldcontinueafterleavingrunway.Welaterused2and3 at 90%reverse
and backedour way out on the samewheeltrackswehadjust made.Companymain-
tenancewaswith usthenandadvisednodamageto aircraft,nopassengerinjuries.Taxied
to ramp,aircraftwasserviced,andwecontinuedour flight.This incidentpointsup that
brakingreportsaremisleadingasgiven.No mentionwasmadethat brakingreport per-
tainedonly to partof runwayor that last3,000ft wasexceedinglyslippery.Wehadabso-
lutely nobrakingfromthetimewewereabout3,000ft from theenduntil wecameslowly
to rest off the runway.Brakingreportsimply runwayconditionandbrakingeffective-
hess- the wholerunway.If far endis nil, thenit shouldbesoreported.I think if it had
beenin thiscase,the incidentwouldnot havehappened.
Thefinal narrativesin this seriesagainemphasizetheneedfelt by flightcrewsfor accurateand
timely informationaboutrunway,taxiway,andrampconditions:lackof informationcausedamis-
hap,whichsodistractedonereporterthathesubsequentlycommittedanavigationalerror.
5. Landed32L. Towerrequestedexpediteclearingrunway.Turnedon taxiwayT2
anddiscoveredit wasnot plowed;wewerenot advisedof same.WehadusedT2 a couple
daysbeforeandit wasclearthen.Tried to makea 180° turn, but after90° of turn,nose
startedto slideandwe stoppedwhilestill on taxiway.ATIS andNOTAMsnevermen-
tionedwhat taxiwayswereopenor closed.The only damagewasnosetaxi-lightburned
out.
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6. Conditionson the runwaywere indicatedas 1/4 to 1/2 in. of slush;50-75c_
coverage. When we touched down the slush started flying all over the place. Our wind-
shield was completely covered and obscured our vision forward. Then one of the engines
on our aircraft quit because of water ingestion. We were unable to taxi on one in all that
slush and it took several minutes to accomplish a restart to get off the runway. An air-
craft on approach behind us had to make a missed approach/go-around. If we had known
the actual condition of the runway (2 to 3 in. of slush, 100% coverage) we never would
have attempted the landing. I believe this hazard could have been eliminated if the airport
authority . . . would recognize some of these hazardous conditions when they make their
runway checks (several had been made). This problem could have been alleviated in any
one of three ways: (1) accurate condition report, (2) begin snow removal, or (3) close the
runway due to unsafe condition at the time.
A STUDYOF NEAR MIDAIR COLLISIONSIN U.S.TERMINAL AIRSPACE
CharlesBillings,RalphGrayson,WilliamHecht,andRenwickCurry
Background
SinceApril 1976,when the NASA Aviation Safety ReportingSystemwas implemented,
potentialor actualconflictsamongaircrafthavebeena leadingtopic in reportssubmittedby both
pilots andair traffic controllers.Thisreport examinesasubsetof conflict reports:thoseconcerned
with nearmidaircollisionsin terminalairspacewithin thecontinentalUnitedStates.
Objective
Theobjectiveof thisstudywasto characterizeASRSreportsof nearmidaircollisionsin terms
of their distribution and operationalsignificance,with emphasison the humanfactorsin such
occurrences.
Definitions
1. Near midair collision (NMAC): A near midair collision is defined for the purposes of this
study as a conflict between two aircraft in which the reporter's estimate of miss distance is less than
500 ft, or evasive action is taken to avoid a collision, or it is reported that there was instffficient
time to take evasive action.
2. Terminal airspace: A near midair collision was described as occurring in terminal airspace if
it occurred within 30 miles of an airport from which an involved aircraft had departed or at which it
intended to land.
3. Terminal control area (TCA): A near midair collision was characterized as occurring within
a terminal control area if its position at the time of the encounter was within the geographic confines
of a TCA, as defined in appropriate Federal Aviation Regulations.
4. Terminal radar service area (TRSA): A near midair collision was characterized as occurring
within a TRSA if its position at the time of the occurrence was within the geographic confines of a
TRSA, as described in appropriate publications.
5. Other terminal airspace (OTA): All near midair collisions that occurred in terminal airspace
but not within a TCA or TRSA were characterized as occurring in other terminal airspace.
Approach
The data in this study were drawn from a total of 2,512 reports received by ASRS during the
period May through part of November, 1978 (6_/z months). Computer-aided retrieval techniques
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were used to select approximately 1,000 reports, each of which was then analyzed to determine the
answers to the following questions:
1. Was the occurrence described in the report a near midair collision as defined above?
2. If so, was the report unique, or was the occurrence also described in other reports?
3. If the report described a valid and unique near midair collision, in what type of airspace
did it occur?
Two research analysts independently examined all questionable reports; the reports were
included in this study only if both analysts agreed that the described occurrence met tile study
criteria.
Results
After the near midair collision reports were identified and duplicate reports were excluded,
they were categorized by the airspace in which they occurred. Table 1 summarizes the results and
contains an estimate of reported NMAC per year in each category of airspace and average number of
NMAC in a terminal area of each category. It was assumed that there were 21 TCA's during the
period of the study, 82 TRSA's during the period, and 407 other terminal areas serving controlled
airports. The count of 407 "other tenninal areas" (OTA's) includes terminal airspace, as defined
above, surrounding TCA's and TRSA's. Near midair collisions occurring in terminal airspace surround-
ing aTCA orTRSA, but not within the stage III airspace, were categorized as occurring in OTA.
TABLE 1.- REPORTED NEAR MIDAIR COLLISIONS IN TERMINAL AIRSPACE
[Based on May-November, 1978, intake.]
Airspace
category
TCA
TRSA
OTA
Number of
terminal
areas
21
82
407
Reported
near midair
collisions
76
120
231
Estimate of
reported
NMAC
per year
140
222
426
Reported
NMAC per
year per
terminal
area
Table 2 relates the estimates of reported near midair collisions to yearly controlled airport traf-
fic volume (refs. 1, 2) in the three categories of terminal areas. It estimates the likelihood that an
aircraft will be involved in a reported near midair collision during a single operation into or out of a
terminal area of the stated type.
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TABLE 2.- REPORTEDNEARMIDAIRCOLLISIONSRELATEDTOTRAFFICVOLUME
Airspace
category
TCA
TRSA
OTA
Estimate of
reported NMAC
per year
140
222
426
Controlled
airport traffic
volume,
millions
7.8
16.2
52.4
Frequency of
reported NMAC
per million
operations
18
14
8
The data in table 2 can be read as follows by using the reciprocals of the numbers in the last
colunln:
1. In TCA's, one NMAC was reported to ASRS for each 56,000 operations (takeoffs or land-
ings at airports within the TCA).
2. In TRSA's, one NMAC was reported to ASRS for each 72,000 operations.
3. In OTA's, one NMAC was reported to ASRS for each 125,000 operations.
In interpreting these statistics, it is critical to note that they represent an estimate of the risk
of an undesired outcome (a near midair collision) during a single exposure of an individual aircraft
to an environment in which that outcome is possible (an operation into or out of a controlled air-
port in a terminal area). This description of risk has been chosen as most appropriate to tile pur-
poses of this study, but other measures of risk are possible and have been used by others (refs 3, 4).
The description of the risk in these terms, or in any other, says nothing about the factors that
may contribute to, or ameliorate, the magnitude of that risk. In this case, many factors modify the
risk of a near midair collision in terminal airspace. Traffic density is an obvious and important
factor, but airspace configuration, air traffic control strategy and tactics, aircraft speed mix, airport
locations, and terrain constraints are others that must be considered in evaluating the risk. Graham
(ref. 5) has shown both a general increase in NMAC as a function of potential conflict pairs of air-
craft (PCP), a factor related to the square of the number of aircraft using a terminal area, and relative
decreases in NMAC rates associated with the provision of stage III procedures in TRSA's and with
airspace segregation and stage III procedures in TCA's.
The ASRS data indicate that near midair collisions are reported more frequently from TCA's
than from TRSA's, and more frequently from TRSA's than from other terminal airspace, in propor-
tion to traffic volume in these categories of airspace. Sources of possible bias in these data must be
examined.
The ASRS is a voluntary system and its reports are not investigated to verify the reported
occurrences. The data reported here are representative only of near midair collisions reported to
ASRS, and these data may be biased in a number of respects. Since the definition of a NMAC used
in classifying the reports is conservative and the reports are voluntary, the frequencies calculated
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from them are almost certainly lower than the true incidence rates, although by what margin cannot
be stated.
Reporter bias may be present in the data. A frightening conflict might well cause a reporter to
underestimate the minimum distance between aircraft. This would tend to increase the nmnber of
conflicts perceived as near midair collisions. On the other hand, reporters tend to "round" their dis-
tance estimates to even hundreds or thousands of feet. The miss distance of exactly 500 ft was
excluded from the NMAC criterion to minimize the effects of rounding.
More ASRS reports are received from air carrier than from general aviation pilots. Since air
carrier operations are a larger proportion of total traffic in T('As, it is likely that TCA NMAC reports
are received more frequently in proportion to traffic vohune.
Reporters, during the period of this study, were offered a waiver of disciplinary action for
reports of violations submitted to ASRS. Since failure to contact AT(" or follow its instructions in
TCA's is a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations, whereas it is not necessarily a violation in
other terminal airspace, pilots may have been more likely to report conflicts in which they were in
the wrong if the conflicts occurred in TCA airspace.
It must also be noted, however, that the ASRS, because it is a confidential third-party reporting
system, may contain data less biased by fear of retribution than data in other systems. This is particu-
larly true of reports involving human error and possible violations of Federal Aviation Regulations.
All of these factors may have tended to bias the data shown here. Nonetheless, conflict reports
are received by ASRS with sufficient frequency to suggest that a problem exists, though tile severity
of the problem is not known. It was noted that in the months immediately following tile San Diego
accident in September 1978, near midair collision reports to ASRS increased by more than 605_.
Since there is no reason to believe that the incidence of NMA("s increased during that period, it
seems likely that the increase in reports represented a more nearly complete picture of the true
situation.
In summary, reporting of near midair collisions may occur more frequently when those
encounters occur in TCA or TRSA airspace. There are several factors, however, that may contribute
to the incidence of near midair collisions in terminal airspace. These factors relate both to human
behavior and system factors.
Discussion
A number of operational and human factors could account for at least part of the differences
in reported NMAC rates in the three categories of terminal airspace. One, mentioned under results,
is simply traffic density. More airplanes in a confined volume of airspace at a given time increase the
likelihood that at least two of them will have an encounter. Working to counter this, air traffic con-
trol strategies utilize track and altitude separation and speed control, and in TCA's, prohibitions on
nonparticipating traffic. The effectiveness of these measures is presently under study by FAA (ref. 5).
Other factors must be considered in high-density terminal areas. Particularly in high-perfor-
mance aircraft, within-cockpit workload is high in terminal airspace. Communications workload is
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alsohigh, and departureand approachpaths requirepreciseflightpathcontrol; all of thesetasks
requireattentionwithin thecockpitandleavelesstimefor externalscanning.Thefollowingreports
discussomeof thesefactors•
• . . Traffic wasnot reportedbyDepartureControl... flightengineerwasoccupiedwith
checklistsandcompanyradioreports... I believethisincidentoccurredprimarilybecause
of our aircraftbeingrequiredto follow anSIDin VFR conditions,requiringmeto keep
my headin thecockpittoo muchfor safety... "
ApproachingXYZ weweregiven. . . two contacts. We were then switched over to XYZ
Tower. Tower identified one contact, but neither of us saw the other one. At this time
the cockpit workload became heavy and suddenly B passed in front of us from left to
right about 100-200 ft... "
• . . If you have ever tried to go from OAK to SJC through the San Francisco TCA, you
are busier than a one-armed paper hanger in a windstorm, trying to change VOR frequen-
cies, to check radials and DMEs, get the ATIS, change approach control frequencies about
four times, and try to watch for traffic and fly the airplane at the same time...
It is clear that prohibitions against uncontrolled traffic in terminal control areas are not entirely
effective. A study by Cunningham of near midair collisions reported to FAA (ref. 6) indicated that
half of 78 near midair collisions in TCA's involved one aircraft not known to ATC. Any interpreta-
tion of near midair collision data within TCA's must take account of this; intruders in TCA's are a
random element in a system designed to provide maximum orderliness in high-density terminal areas.
The following example illustrates this problem.
Shortly after turning the SID heading of 340 °, we passed directly over the second aircraft.
An engine failure after takeoff could have resulted in a collision• The second aircraft was
apparently violating the TCA. The tower did not advise of the aircraft and I presume they
were not aware of it. The other aircraft appeared to be flying at about 50 ft above the
water, presumably in a deliberate attempt to operate unobserved in the TCA...
If ASRS reports are representative, many pilots under radar control believe that they will be
advised of traffic that represents a potential conflict and behave accordingly. They tend to relax
their visual scan for other traffic until warned of its presence; when warned of a conflicting aircraft,
they tend to look for it to the exclusion of within-cockpit tasks and scanning for unreported traffic.
These examples are typical:
Flight was eastbound . . . slant range visibility was between 2-5 n. mi .... when incident
occurred. The other aircraft was about 400 ft above . . . I saw him begin a climbing left
turn and I began a descending left turn . . . fatigue was definitely a factor as was my
dependency on radar since I had just been released by XYZ Departure Control and was
somewhat complacent in looking for other traffic.
• . . Approach Control called out traffic one o'clock, 4 miles .... I reported no contact as
it was hazy .... Approach seemed rather concerned that we report the traffic going across
twelve o'clock in sight. | did see the traffic at 12:30 high, and as I was no longer concerned
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with that oneI lookedto my left andsawaircraftB at my altitude - at 100 yards ....
I took evasive action and called Approach on this traffic, which they said they did not
see. If Approach Control had not diverted nay attention to traffic which was not as
important, I would never have gotten so close to aircraft B... I do not consider it a sale
procedure to have to make four frequency changes within 140 miles of the airport, which
requires the pilot to divert his attention from looking around . . . l feel the pilot should
be left as free as possible to fly his aircraft and keep a sharp lookout for others.
The air traffic controller cannot inform the pilot of traffic that is not visible on his radar scope,
nor can he provide separation from such traffic. It is plain that at least some pilots receiving stage
III services believe that they will be told about all traffic that represents a threat, yet controllers can
handle traffic only with regard to threats they can see, as in the following situations.
• . . Approach was informed of the (conflicting) aircraft's location and we were told he
was not painting this aircraft. Approach did inform aircraft behind us that the small air-
craft had been seen at 8,000, but that he still had negative radar contact. This incident
points out to me the very serious situation we have allowed to occur. We have concen-
trated all of our anti-collision avoidance with the radar controller and have left the pilot
with only his eyes. All the newest and most sophisticated radar in the world didn't help
here because the controller had no radar contact .... I would also like to comment (that)
civil jet transports require eyes in the cockpit when being flown on arrivals, departures,
and approaches. We cannot always be looking out...
I noticed aircraft B that had departed runway 19L (I departed 19R) .... Aircraft B was
close so I asked the radar controller about it. The controller was completely without
information regarding aircraft B. Fortunately, I saw him in plenty of time to avoid his
converging flightpath. Climbing out of 3,500, I had to take evasive action to miss a new
aircraft, C. Again, radar had no contact, in any way, with aircraft C. Since both incidents
occurred at the same (terminal), I am hopeful some investigation will result in action that
will plug a weak spot in the system...
One is thus faced with a situation in which pilots may expect more from the ATC system than
it can deliver, and in which controllers may be expected to provide more information than their
equipment gives them. Whether this problem exists because of misunderstandings, lack of pilot edu-
cation, or the implied promise of stage III procedures is not fully understood, but the data indicate
that it does exist, as the following reports suggest.
• . . Approach called traffic at 3 and 4 miles at ten o'clock. Looking for called traffic
(which I never saw) I noticed another aircraft at my altitude, ten o'clock, less than 1/2
mile, closing. I vacated 2,500 for 2,000, turned . . . and told Approach I didn't have the
called traffic but did have the guy I just missed... Since we were both in TCA, we both
should have been under "control" . . . my work for last 8 years has been with ARTS II
and III, so I believe in the equipment and not in other humans...
• .. We feel that radar should have had aircraft B in contact at the time we took off and we
should have been advised of the traffic at or before taking off - the controller must have
had B on his scope long before he told us about it...
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• . . I addedfull power,pulledbackandexecutedasteepleft bankto avoidtheotherair-
craft . . . I advisedthe controller. . . At no timedid thecontrolleradvisemeof thetwo
aircraftin my areaandI am 100%suretheotheraircraftdid not seeme...
• . . I madeanabruptevasivedescentandaircraftB wentoverheadwithin 100ft. I asked
the controller if he hadmein radarcontact... (and)had other traffic in my area;he
repliedyes.I wasin aTRSAandassumedI wasgettingstageIII service...
• . . I avoided. . . andinformed(Approach). . . whenreestablished(on tile approach)
I askedwhy I wasnot informedof traffic.... He repliedthat hewas"too busyto call
traffic." I believethat if thehazewereanythicker,I wouldhavehit theotherplane....
This attitude that callingtraffic is asecondaryfunction,ispreposterous..,avoidingcol-
lisionis to metheprimaryfunctionof anapproachcontroller.
Somegeneralaviationpilotsstatethat theyprefernot to utilizestageIII proceduresinTRSA's.
Although themeritsof thisviewaredebatable,it isclearthat not allof thesepilotsaresimplyrecal-
citrant,asin thefollowingcase.
• . . I departedABConaVFRflight to DEF.After leavingthe traffic pattern, I contacted
ABC Departure requesting traffic advisories. I was radar identified . . . and advised of
two targets... I did not see either aircraft and banked for a better view. Still not seeing
them, I rolled back level and immediately saw aircraft B at one o'clock. Before I could
react, aircraft B passed directly in front of me .... As do many pilots in this area,
I decline stage III procedures at ABC because of unnecessary, inefficient, and sometimes
unsafe altitude and heading restrictions .... I have been able to practice more effective
collision avoidance by listening to communications on the frequency than by receiving
advisories .... I'm afraid many pilots get a false sense of security when under radar con-
trol or advisory...
Those pilots who do not understand them must be taught the limitations of terminal radar,
and of the controllers who use it as their primary source of information• Many aircraft in TRSA's,
and some intruders in TCA's, are not transponder-equipped; such aircraft are often not visible to
controllers. These aircraft, and many others near TCA boundaries, may represent a threat detectable
only by the pilot, and then only if he is looking for them.
The highest level of pilot vigilance must be maintained to avoid midair collisions, regardless of
the airspace in which operations are being conducted and regardless of the ATC services being
utilized. No pilot should permit himself to be lulled into a false sense of security by ATC procedures
that cannot necessarily guarantee separation under visual meteorological conditions.
Air traffic controllers cannot be effective in providing stage III services without good informa-
tion. Cunningham (ref. 6) indicated that 158 of 268 near midair collisions in TCA's and TRSA's
involved at least one aircraft "not known to or in communication with" an ATC facility. There are
only two ways, in the present system, that controllers can obtain information about the three-
dimensional position of aircraft within their airspace. They can be informed verbally by the pilots
of such aircraft, or they can be informed visually by the output of functioning mode-C transponders.
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Both FAAandASRSdatamakeit plainthat the lackof suchinfonnationisacausalfactorin asub-
stantialnumberof nearmidaircollisionsin stageIII airspace.
Failureto utilize transpondersin aircraftequippedwith themalsoderogatesafetyin stage111
airspace,yet ASRShasreceivedseveralreportslike the following,describingnearmidaircollisions
in whichthe nonparticipatingaircraft'stranspondersquawkfirst becamevisibleto ATC moments
aftertheencounter.
• . . Wewere 14milesnorthwestof Atlanta descending to 5,000 ft. Clear of clouds, hazy,
visibiliW 3-4 miles. Passing through 7,000 ft, aircraft B moved from left to right. We passed
directly under him (and) heard the sound of his engine as he passed us .... ATC reported
no traffic in our area. Moments later they reported a target westbound at 7,200 ft. The
other aircraft apparently saw us go under him, turned on his transponder and called
Approach for radar traffic information...
Aircraft A appeared on radar over the outer marker, northbound, primary target. Aircraft
B departed on runway 22. Controller called "pop-up" traffic to aircraft B. Pilot of air-
craft B sighted traffic at approximately the same altitude. Aircraft B advised it was close
and about head-on at the same altitude. It was a single-engine. After both aircraft passed,
the unknown traffic turned on his transponder and squawked VFR 1,200, mode C. The
unknown traffic never contacted Approach Control...
Pilots can take many steps to decrease the likelihood of encounters in and around stage Ill air-
space• An earlier ASRS report on problems associated with TCA and TRSA airspace discussed sev-
eral of them (ref. 7). The use of strobes and landing lights and the use of transponders will assist
both participants and nonparticipants. Avoidance of ILS approach courses at low altitudes is partic-
ularly important, as aircrew making an approach are often under heavy workload in the vicinity of
the outer marker• Avoidance of the edges of TCA's and TRSA's would substantially reduce near
midair collision hazards: these areas have been cited as extremely congested in numerous reports•
Uncontrolled VFR corridors through TCA's are usually heavily traveled, of very limited dimensions,
and have also been described as the sites of a number of near midair collisions.
• . . No evasive action was required because we had remained VMC and above the glide
slope until seeing the traffic . . . it appears the aircraft may have been a departure from
Van Nuys... attempting a VFR climb through the "sucker hole" that just happened to
be at the outer marker...
Aircraft was cleared for approach to CLE, ILS23L, to intercept glide slope at or above
4,000 ft. Descent began slightly above glide slope• At Stadium OM, still about 300 ft
above glide slope (3,300 MSL) second officer called traffic at one o'clock, slightly low,
nearly over Stadium at an estimated altitude of 3,000 ft .... Approach Control stated no
one was working the traffic...
Piloting aircraft A, a helicopter VFR from Van Nuys to Los Alamitos via the VFR cor-
ridor over LAX, we were in radar contact and receiving VFR advisories. An aircraft was
observed to overtake and pass on the left side of our aircraft within 75 ft. This aircraft
was level and at our altitude. Its tail number was ABCDE• It passed and then cut across
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our course,descending.., to thetraffic patternatTorrance.Thecontrolleradvisedthat
hecouldnot identify thisaircraft...
With respecto participationin stageIII servicesin TRSA's,theFAA hasstatedthat 80-90%
of VFR aircraft avail themselvesof suchservices(ref. 8). Yet, FAA and military datacitedby
Cunninghanlindicate that almosttwo-thirdsof nearmidair collisionsin TRSA's involve a non-
participating aircraft. Clearly, the risk of a near midair collision is disproportionately high for the
aircraft that does not participate in stage III services.
If near midair collisions represent a hazard, as seems obvious, the attack on the problem should
have two objectives: to protect the system against such encounters insofar as is possible, but also
to make the system as tolerant as possible with respect to unexpected encounters. Graham's study
of ASRS data (ref. 5) suggests that there are TCA and TRSA locations where the stage II1 concept
seems to work extremely well, and others where it appears to be less effective. Examination of the
differences between these might be most helpful to those who must provide and utilize such services
at the new locations where they are being implemented.
We have attempted, in the foregoing discussion, to describe certain behavioral and system fac-
tors that appear to be associated with near midair collisions in U.S. terminal airspace. ASRS reports
provide a useful source of data for studies of these occurrences; further studies by the ASRS staff
will examine the associated factors in more detail.
The system of separation assurance is not "error-proof," nor, in all probability, will it ever be.
Separation can be assured most effectively by providing air traffic controllers with the best possible
information about all aircraft within their area of responsibility; by minimizing flightcrew workload
in terminal airspace, thus permitting them to maintain the best possible outside surveillance; and by
making pilots aware of the critical importance of maintaining such surveillance, regardless of the ser-
vices they are receiving. It is hoped that this study and report will help to increase that level of
awareness.
Summary
A study was made of 427 reported near midair collisions in U.S. terminal airspace to elucidate
system and human factors associated with such occurrences. It was found that near midair collisions
are reported to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System more frequently from TCA's than
from TRSA's, and more frequently from TRSA's than from other terminal airspace, as a linear func-
tion of traffic volume in these categories of airspace. Sources of bias in these findings were examined.
A variety of human and system factors was found to be associated with these near midair colli-
sions. Flightcrew workload, limited visual scan while under radar control, misunderstanding of the
limitations of the ATC system, and failure to utilize transponders were observed. A substantial num-
ber of reported near midair collisions in stage IIl terminal airspace involved at least one aircraft not
participating in stage IIl services. For these reasons, pilots must exercise the highest level of vigilance
for other traffic, regardless of airspace or radar services being utilized.
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ALERT BULLETINS
Introduction
Alert Bulletins are a form of response by ASRS to problems in the National Aviation System as
those problems are perceived by the persons reporting them. In the opinion of ASRS staff members,
these alert bulletins deal with problems that constitute a continuing hazard: they require considera-
tion and, when feasible, correction by responsible authority. This report continues the practice of
providing a sampling of Alert Bulletins; the bulletins are grouped as they pertain to navigation, air-
port facilities and maintenance, airport lighting and approach aids, and air traffic control facilities
and procedures.
Navigation
1. Text ofAB: Hilo, Hawaii, HOA NDB: A reporter points out that thePahoaNDBatHilo
becomes the only navaid when the VOR is out of service. He cites two recent instances - when the
VOR was OTS for maintenance - when the NDB signal could not be read by a military pilot on the
ground at Hilo nor from 40 n. mi. out at 4,000 ft by a civilian pilot. The military pilot was able to
pick up the NDB signal after takeoff, but lost it again in 2 or 3 minutes. The reporter notes two
unsatisfactory condition reports have not effected an improvement in the signal strength of the
NDB. He expresses his belief that the lack of reliability of the NDB- particularly in poor weather-
creates a potentially hazardous situation.
Text of FAA response: The following actions are being planned to eliminate coverage problems
associated with the Pahoa (POA) NDB:
1. Change frequency from 221 kHz to another frequency in the 350 kHz range (to be
accomplished in approximately 2 months).
2. Replace existing 50-W TM 3 transmitter with new 400-W solid-state equipment. This is part
of an Airway Facilities national program to replace obsolete L/MF equipment. The expected ship-
ping date for this transmitter is September 1979.
2. Text of AB: Miami, FL, Oceanic Control; Nassau, Bahama Islands, Airway A-17: A pilot
reports that the intersections RESIN and AYSON are located on Airway A- 17 southeast of Nassau,
and that phonetic similarity can, and often does, engender reporting and clearance misunderstand-
ings. Reporter notes that AYSON was changed from the original GRAYSON to meet the five-letter
system requirement, and suggests that the existing potential confusion could be eliminated through
substitution of GRAYS or GAYSO for AYSON.
Text of FAA Response: AYSON intersection on Bahamas Route A-17 was changed to INDEE
through coordination with San Juan area officer. The change was published in the National Flight
Data Digest dated March 30, 1979, with an effective date of June 14, 1979.
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3. Text of AB: Miami,FL, Nassau,Bahama Islands: The outer compass locator (KEYES) for
the Miami ILS runway 27L transmits oll a frequency of 248 kttz with identifier MI( .... ). The
Nassau radio beacon transmits on 251 kHz, identifier ZQA: the identifier is transmitted at a very
slow rate, resulting in tile first letter, Z ( .... ), sounding to a listener very similar to the KI:(YtiS
identification. The possibility of confusing the identifiers, coupled with the small frequency separa-
tion between the two transmitters (within the calibration tolerance of most ADF receiver dials) and
the greater power of the Nassau signal, presents a strong risk that a pilot eastbound toward Miami
could utilize the incorrect homing signal and thus continue tlight beyond Miami and over water. Air
carrier pilot reporter recommends a change of one of the two frequencies to eliminate the potential
hazard cited.
Text of FAA response: Wc have reviewed the subject alert bulletin and have decided that a fre-
quency change to the Miami outer compass locator (KEYESI would eliminate the potential hazard
described. The necessary, action will be initiated to effect such frequency change.
4. Text of AB: Jacksonville, NC, HAH Non-Directional Radio Beacon: A pilot reports that
HAH Non-Directional Radio Beacon, intended to define a segment of Atlantic Route 7, transmits
on a frequency of 198 kHz, which is below the 200 kHz lower limit assigned for aeronautical fre-
quencies. Because of this, certain new types of radio direction-finding equipment with digital
control markings commencing at 200 kHz cannot receive the beacon. Reporter states that inability
to utilize HAH forces pilot reliance on radar vectors for navigation.
Text of FAA Response: The high power for this radio beacon was required for over-water
flight between New York and Miami. No frequency in the 200-415 kHz band was available. Numer-
ous lower power facilities would have had to give way (changed or eliminated) to make room for
this high-powered station. Since November 22, 1977, the lower limit for aeronautical radio beacons
has been 190 kHz. The present assignment may be an inconvenience to some users but is not con-
sidered unsafe nor contributing to an unsafe condition.
Airports: Facilities and Maintenance
5. Text of AB: Little Rock, AR, Adams Field Airport: Two recent reports describe an air-
craft on taxiway "F" crossing the end of runway 32 when runway 14 was active. While the crossing
aircraft did not contact Ground Control, both reporters suggest that there is a need for appropriate
markings on taxiway "F" to indicate to pilots that taxiway "F" crosses the end of runway 32/14
and to give pilots a visible hold-short point when runway 32/14 is active.
Text of FAA Response: Aviation Safety Report AB 79:3 has been discussed among the
Arkansas Division of Aeronautics, the Adams Field Airport Management, and the FAA, including
Airports, Flight Standards, and Air Traffic personnel. The crux of the problem is allegedly insuffi-
cient markings on taxiway F: however, hold lines and runway intersection signs conforming with
current standards were installed during a recent ADAP project. Although no details of the incidents
are known, their infrequency suggests that the problems were a matter of inattention rather than a
system deficiency.
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Noamountof reconfigurationor installation of new guidance facilities will provide an efficient
yet fail-safe system. All airport users have a responsibility to operate safely on the field. In our
opinion, this intersection conforms to standards, and no corrective action is required.
6. Text of AB: St. Louis, MO, Lambert International Airport, Taxiway "F," Runway 13/31:
A report notes that taxiway "F" at this facility has runway markings designating it as runway
13/3 I, but is used only as a taxiway and is shown on the Jeppesen airport charts as a taxiway. The
reporter contends that pilots of aircraft, when cleared to land on runway 12L/30R, frequently align
themselves with taxiway "F" (runway 13/31) because it is adjacent and parallel to runway 12L/30R
and has runway markings. The report references a recent incident of an aircraft taxiing on "F"
while another aircraft cleared for landing on runway 12L approached taxiway "F" (runway 13) and
was so low when noticed and diverted by the tower controller that a near miss with the taxiing air-
craft occurred. The reporter suggests the removal of the runway 13/31 designators to avoid further
incidents.
Text of FAA Response: Airport manager was contacted; he advised that the markings had
been removed. In addition, the taxiway will be overlaid and extended this summer.
7. Text of AB: San Francisco, CA, San Francisco International Airport: Reports indicate
that wide-body aircraft holding between runways 28L and 28R can constitute an obstructing hazard
for aircraft landing on 28L. One reporter, while acknowledging that the hazard may be more
psychological than real, contends that the effect is the same on a pilot's decision to maneuver to
avoid the apparent hazard or to execute a go-around. In addition, one report notes that jet exhaust
directed across the runway could cause dangerous or distracting turbulence.
Text of FAA Response: The situation described by the reporter does not constitute
a safety hazard based on current taxiway holding-line criteria. Specifically, runways 28L
(10,600 ft x 200 ft) and 28R (11,870 ftx 200 ft) centerlines are separated by a distance of 750 ft.
Allowing the required 150 ft for each taxiway holding line at either end of the adjoining taxiway,
250 ft remain to accommodate heavy jet aircraft holding short of 28R. Considering the following
aircraft lengths, there is sufficient space to contain heavy jet aircraft: DC-10, 182 ft; L-1011,
177 ft; B-747, 232 ft (longest version).
Although the problem may be more psychological than real, particularly regarding jet exhaust
turbulence, it nonetheless merits consideration. This is especially true in view of the present FAA
effort promoting the maintenance of an obstacle-clear area (runway safety zone) 300 ft either side
of all precision instrument runway centerlines for runway holding-line marking purposes.
In support of the aforementioned effort, the FAA is now considering revising the distance
standard for taxiway holding lines from precision instrument runways and improving holding-line
visibility (e.g., signs and markings). A decision is expected in the very near future.
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8. Text of AB: Tucson,AZ, TucsonInternationalAirport: A reportfrom acontrollernotes
the recentestablishmentof severalfixed-baseoperationsin the areabeyondthe approachendof
runway21, whichhasa displacedthresholdof 500 ft; presentaxiwaysjointherunwayat thedis-
placementpoint ratherthanat the actualend.ThenewFBOareais inaccessibleto taxiingaircraft
from otherpartsof theairport exceptvia the initial 500ft of the runwayandaroadway/taxiway
from the runwayend.Reportercontendsthat this conditionis inefficientandcouldbehazardous
by addingto controllerworkload,causingdelaysto other aircraft,and,on occasion,leadingto
unauthorizedrunwayincursionsby pilots unfamiliarwith thearea.He recommendsthat the con-
structionbeexpeditedof newtaxiwaysconnectingthe FBOareawith theendof runway21 and
with existingtaxiway"C".
Text of Responsefrom AirportAuthority: Theextensionof taxiway"C" to theapproachend
of runway21,whichwill servethe referenced new FBO area, has been designed and will go to bid
on April 15, 1979 with construction anticipated to be completed by December 1979.
If I can provide you with any additional information, please feel free to contact me.
Text of FAA Response: A new taxiway was constructed to the end of runway 21 from the
Fixed-Base Operations area north of the runway under ADAP-09. Construction started Septem-
ber 25, 1978, and is complete. The final inspection is scheduled for April 16, 1979. Construction
was delayed due to abnormal weather conditions.
Taxiway C is being extended to the end of runway 21 on the south side under ADAP-11. Bids
opened April 5, 1979, with Notice to Proceed estimated for May 28, 1979. Construction period is
180 days. Estimated acceptance date is November 23, 1979. Existing taxiways in the area will con-
nect to this extension.
It should be noted that we coordinate all development under ADAP in accordance with
standard regional procedures and that the ATCT at Tucson was informed of the above development
in accordance with those procedures.
Airports: Lighting and Approach Aids
9. Text of AB: Orlando, FL, Orlando International Airport: A recent report indicates that
although the VASI on runway 18L at MCO is reported as commissioned and noted as being avail-
able on the approach charts, it is not being turned on by the tower controllers. On one occasion
when queried by the reporter as to the reason the VASI was not available, the controllers contended
that they had been instructed not to use the VASI system.
The reporter is not aware of any NOTAMS on the runway 18L VASI at MCO and feels this
VASI is a much needed landing aid on 18L to prevent a possible landing short of the runway.
Text of FAA Response: The VASI on runway 18L at Orlando International Airport (MCO)
was out of service for most of the month of January 1979 due to a part failure for which there was
no replacement part available. The controllers were in fact told not to attempt to turn the 18L
VASI system on due to the possibility of further damage to the system.
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An out-of-serviceVASI meetsNOTAMcriteria "L" whichmeanslocal disseminationonly;
thus, althoughthis outagewasreported,that informationwasnot disseminatedbeyondthe local
level.
Thesystemispresentlyoperational.
10. Text of AB: Fresno,CA, FresnoAir Terminal:A recentASRSreport statesthat at
FresnoAir Terminal an unlighted air carrier aircraft is customarily parked overnight in a ramp posi-
tion that hinders the movement of arriving aircraft attempting to taxi to their own gates via a high-
speed turnoff. Lack of illumination in the area prevents flightcrews from observing the parked air-
craft in sufficient time to avoid the necessity of executing 180 ° turns to return to the taxiway and
follow a different route to the terminal. Reporter feels that, in addition to tile inconvenience caused
by this practice, the unlighted parked aircraft represents a hazardous obstruction to movement on
the airport and recommends that floodlighting be provided in the affected area.
Text of response from Airport Operations Supervisor: Letter from Fresno Airports Operations
Supervisor to Airline Station Manager: A number of reports have been received recently by this
office, concerning your company's turbojet parked unlighted at gate No. 9 (north end of the Con-
course), during nighttime. Lack of illumination in the area prevents flightcrews of other aircraft
exiting from runway 29R/11L from observing the unlighted RON aircraft in sufficient time to avoid
the necessity of executing 180 ° turns to follow a different route to the terminal, when they attempt
to taxi to their own gate, via the high-speed taxiways.
In addition to the inconvenience caused by this situation, it is felt that the unlighted aircraft
(RON at gate No. 9) represents a hazardous obstruction to movement on the ramp at night.
In light of the above, it is requested that the use of parking gate No. 9 to park RON aircraft
be discontinued immediately, unless the aircraft is either internally lighted or provided with
obstruction lights surrounding it, or otherwise rendered visible at night.
(Please note that, intentionally, floodlighting is not provided north of the Concourse, in order
not to create a "blinding effect" on pilots landing on or taking off from 11R/29L.)
Your cooperation is much appreciated in disseminating the above information to all concerned
airline personnel. Meanwhile, should you need further clarification regarding the above, please feel
free to contact me.
ATC: Facilities and Procedures
11. Text of AB: The five letter fix designator TOUTU on the SDF approach to runway 27,
Elkhart Muni Airport (EKM), Elkhart, IN has a phonetic sound which is essentially the same as the
number TWO TWO. Location, altitude, and distance confusion results between pilots and controllers
during radio usage. Name change recommended by reporter.
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Text of FAA Response: Effective 8/10/78 the present TOUTU intersection will be changed to
POLER. Coordination has been accomplished with the charting agency (NOS) and South Bend
Approach Control.
12. Text of AB: Wheeling, IL, Palwaukee Airport: The lack of physical security measures,
particularly fencing, to prevent nonaviation vehicular and pedestrian activity on and near aircraft
operational areas is reported to be creating a safety hazard at this facility. In one recent instance, a
light turbojet aircraft landing on runway 34 encountered several children on bicycles during the air-
craft's roll-out; a reporter noted that the encounter could have been much more serious except for
the fact that the turbojet's pilot was forewarned of the children by another pilot who happened to
see the bicycle activity and heard the turbojet's landing clearance.
The issue of Palwaukee's minimal physical security measures was the subject of a NASA ASRS
message to the FAAin May of 1976 (see TCR 007, item 3). The FAA response (dated June 8, 1976)
to that message reads in part:
Palwaukee is a privately owned airport and is not eligible for federal funds. The Illinois
Department of Transportation has determined that it would not be in the public interest
to recommend closing the airport based on the facts at hand. They also recommend that
the tower chief, and other assigned personnel, should continue to work closely with the
airport owner to assure that all possible measures have been taken to protect the aircraft
movement areas from unauthorized use by people and vehicles. FAA concurs with the
State."
Recent ASRS reports indicate that the situation reported in May 1976, continues to exist and
allege that serious conflict situations occur daily.
Text of FAA Response: The situation at Palwaukee is as previously stated. However, the
region is attempting to get the airport owner and the tower people together to work out any diffi-
culties as they develop.
13. Text of AB: Parkersburg, WV, Wood County Airport: A pilot reports that aircraft radio
reception from the Parkersburg ATCT is frequently lost or garbled due to interference from aircraft
transmissions to Standiford Approach Control (Louisville, KY); only aircraft in flight in the
vicinity of SDF create the radio interference, SDF Approach Control's transmissions are not an
interference factor. The reporter notes that "it is very frustrating to hear aircraft reporting at an
altitude that you're presently occupying and wondering if he's at PKB or SDF."
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Text of FAA Response:ParkersburgATCTadvisedthat duringthe summerof 1978,several
complaintsof this interferencewerereceived.Sincethat time, therehasbeenno problem.Both
assignmentsareveryold (in excessof 10years).It is not knownif theproblemwasthe resultof
unusualpropagationconditionsor temporary procedure changes at Louisville. We do not plan to
make any frequency changes at this time.
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, California 94035, August 1, 1980
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